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# THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

## PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS

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### THE DEFECT OF CURRENT DEMOCRACY

DEMOCRACY, the notion most loved by the modern occidental, the faith to which we are without reservation committed—dare we suspect in it aught of imperfection?

Yet it must be remembered that when the emotions are deeply engaged, then more than ever is dispassionate reflection needed. And especially so here: for the term in question, like the ideals it reveres, is no static one. Its application is reaching far beyond its birthplace, politics; democracy, as to-day conceived, is an all-pervading spirit, a philosophy of life, to most of us indeed the synonym of the all-good. By its standards we adjudge merit in the most diverse fields; we praise a leader for his democratic manners, we brand as undemocratic an educational project, we reject the older conception of God as an autocrat, art and literature we insist must become democratic if they are to endure—and so on. And in all this how ambiguous is the word! The United States government, some of us believe, is the only true form of democracy; the Bolsheviks say the same of their own system; free competition in industry, and state ownership, alike claim the title. A recent writer declares that democracy is not representative government, nor government by majority, nor equal suffrage, saying "We have not even a conception of what democracy means; that conception is yet to be forged out of the crude ore of life" (M. P. Follett, *The New State*, p. 3). When a notion so profoundly influential is thus contradictorily interpreted, it appears to be high time to put it through a sifting process. The fact is that men take democracy as a cherished emblem; they set up what they believe to be the ethical and social good and call it by the sacred name. And it would almost seem as if these ideals had little in common save their opposition to aristocracy.

It is of course profitless to enter upon a verbal discussion; it does not matter which definition has the first right to the term. We wish to learn what is the ethical and social ideal that does justice to the needs of human nature, and whether or not current interpretations of democracy adequately provide for these needs. And in order to ascertain this we must bring to light those needs, those ideals, whose

satisfaction is essential to man's successful prosecution of his various activities. What ideals have governed men's procedure in science, in art, in religion, in morals, *etc*? And if our inquiry would be fundamental, reaching to the very roots of human nature, it must be a broad one, covering as many of these fields as possible; we shall however, for reasons of space, here restrict ourselves to the fields of science, religion, morals, and education. Probably these will afford a basis broad enough for safe generalization.

What ideals, so far as an outsider can judge, have the scientists followed in their work? The scientific attitude seems to be that of free inquiry or empiricism. Nothing is prejudged: a fair field and no favor, for all facts alike. In contrast with theology, which is interested inquiry, science is disinterested inquiry. Every fact is to be recorded, every hypothesis to be allowed a hearing, all to be tested equally. This is the spirit of induction of the "true Baconian principles" upon which Darwin declared that he had worked. Is this motive of equality then the essence of the scientific point of view? Clearly it is no more than half the story. Recording of all facts without discrimination of important from unimportant would be stupidity. Some are to be selected, others neglected. Scientific skill, it would appear, is conditioned by the knowledge how to distinguish. Nay more, it consists in forsaking at times the spirit of disinterested inquiry, and selecting such facts as will prove a certain hypothesis; in active looking for a certain type of fact more than for other types. Unless one becomes enamored of a theory he will hardly find all the evidence for it; unless he heartily dislikes another he will not easily discover all the evidence against that. Disinterested inquiry, so necessary in the inductive state, must later be replaced by interested, even prejudiced inquiry. Of course it is only at a certain stage that this is necessary. But note that it is at the interesting, the progressive stage, when explanations begin to dawn upon the inquirer, that this motive of preference is necessary.

In other ways too preference and selection are unavoidable. One must discard certain hypotheses out of hand, as not worth entertaining; and according to his degree of expertness, is one able to reject without trial more and more of the possible explanations that suggest themselves. Also, of those that would pass the tests, one chooses the most fertile. The principle of economy compels us to prefer the theory that will account for the greatest number of facts: whose deductive power is greatest. In the free competition of facts and theories which constitutes the growth of science, some facts and some theories are so superior that they will have their way, and progress in science lies in recognizing this difference. Besides the motive of equality, then, which controls the inductive side, we find that the

counter-motive of distinction, which controls the deductive aspect; and the latter, while by no means more necessary, is more fertile for advancement. For it is preeminently by the ability to distinguish relevant fact from irrelevant, fruitful theory from unfruitful, and by the fecundity of his imagination, that the discoverer in science is known. Creative genius emphasizes distinction.

Treating now of science as a body of doctrine, let us consider the relation between law and fact. Both of course are equally necessary. Yet every science, as it grows, becomes better organized: which means that it becomes more of a deductive system. It contains a hierarchy of laws, under which the facts are subsumed, and hereby the laws are placed above the facts as explaining them. From the logical point of view, this is a distinction of higher from lower. Or if one holds that law is only a shorthand and résumé of facts, then he will say that its superiority resides in its utility and economy rather than in its explanatory virtue. In mathematics, which expresses an ideal of all science, the whole body of doctrine is generated out of a few initial postulates; and these postulates are logically superior to their consequences.

We find then two motives in man's scientific activity, *viz.*, equality, and distinction or superiority. On the one hand, all facts are equally to be accepted, law and fact are equally requisite, and all hypotheses are entitled to fair consideration. On the other hand some facts show, as science grows, a superior distinction over others; laws are found to be more significant than facts, certain theories than certain others. Nor does the superiority establish itself as a necessary consequence of the equality. Facts, arrayed dispassionately by a recording intelligence, do not push out from among themselves those which are intrinsically pivotal; theories, competing before the mind of the thinker, do not of themselves resign and give place to the best. The thinker has to choose the more interesting and promising, and give it greater opportunity than the rest, developing its consequences to a greater extent, treating it as altogether a privileged thing. Equality is then a necessary, but not a sufficient condition of scientific inquiry: superiority, being added, alone suffices to make it go. Both motives are necessary, and in this respect neither has the advantage; but they are not equally valuable, since superiority is more in evidence at the productive stage.

We pass to the religious consciousness.

The Christian church is severed into two great halves, Catholic and Protestant; the former standing in the main for the principle of authority, the latter for the right of private judgment. On the Catholic view, some men know religious truth better than others; these men are inspired by divine grace. Such were the disciples of

Jesus, particularly Peter; and the inspiration was transmitted through Peter to his successors in the Papal chair. They are the religious experts to whom the believer trusts his soul's welfare, as he trusts his body's to the physician. It is open to any one to live the good life, but good works alone do not entitle one to become a religious expert. All men have equal opportunity to perform them, but God, or his representatives in the church, selects some above others to be the special channels of His inspiration. In this way Catholicism uses both the motive of equality and that of distinction. To every man it is open to become a believer and by good works a candidate for saintship, but Divine authority will choose for its own reasons only certain ones of those candidates. Protestant churches, on the other hand, while displaying a similar duality, lay more stress upon the motive of equality. Their respective creeds, to be sure, are determined already, by their founders, and the individual member can not alter them to-day—so far there is authority; but he is allowed a far greater liberty of interpretation than the Catholic. Indeed, with the Unitarian there is almost perfect liberty, the only authority lying, if anywhere, in the direct words of Jesus himself. Also, with perhaps the single exception of the Calvinist, he may be saved by individual good works or faith. Protestantism claims, I believe, no infallibility in any fixed body of men; and all men are to have equal opportunity for salvation or saintship. It is apparently true, moreover, that to-day the element of authority in Protestantism is fast diminishing, and an attitude like that of the Unitarian is becoming common, *viz.*, theology (authoritative doctrine) plays but a small part; one is to take the Bible as he understands it for his guide and his desert is to be adjudged by his conduct alone. Here the motive of equality of all men, signalized by the phrase "brotherhood of man," assumes the dominant rôle. It looks as if the last vestige of authority, even that ascribed to Jesus and God the Father, were about to vanish; for Jesus is practically treated as no more than the elder brother and God as no personal monarch, but a sort of immanent law of progress in human history.

Yet even here is found the principle of distinction, for if religion does not turn into morality, it worships *some* highest principle, be it only dubbed Humanity or a Power that works for progress; and reverence for such a principle makes distinction of high and low, with at least *superior* power ascribed to the principle. Perhaps the transition of religion to morality is marked by the view of James that God is no king, not even a gentleman, but a sort of superior people's helper, sharing many of our faults, growing stronger and better as we grow. But here we are passing the

bounds of Christianity. In that field, at any rate, we seem to find the two motives of equality and distinction; the Catholics laying more stress on the latter, the Protestants on the former. However, inasmuch as the difference of religion from morality is reverence for some one greatest principle, be it personal or impersonal, it seems that all religions are at bottom based upon distinction, *viz.*, in so far as they worship something. The degree of distinction between God and man, and the degree to which distinctions among men in their relation to God penetrate, differ in the several religions. So far as I know, all religions have had priests and seers. Yet it remains true that all men are declared, in one religion after another, to be of themselves and apart from God, equal before Him. If they are in this sense equal, however, it is because He created them all; the motive of distinction, being the ground of equality, is the more fundamental of the two. Jesus himself appears to have held this view: he commanded *first* the love of God and *second* the love of the neighbor as equal to one's self.

Morality, it would seem at first, is governed solely by the principle of equality; at any rate the modern morality of altruism and social service. The adherents of this school tell us that we should no longer content ourselves with the narrow, personal code of righteousness which our fathers respected. It is not enough to be temperate, or chaste, or frugal, or dutiful parents and children, faithful spouses, upright in business, *etc.*; we must reach out and lift the burden of woe from the poor and the oppressed. For all men are equal; at least equally deserving of respect and the right to live decently and usefully. To better the world is to equalize the members of the world; and first of all perhaps, to ensure enough wealth to every one to enable him to live decently and usefully, to contribute his meed to society.

Now by what means shall this be accomplished? Not merely, I presume, by a redistribution of wealth on fairer terms than now hold; not merely by preaching to the poor the necessity of thrift or of small families; not merely by urging the laborer to increase production—though perhaps by all of these together, or even by some other device added. There is, however, no way of making permanent any system of social benefit except by educating the recipient to a sense of responsibility. Until people of moderate incomes can learn to live within those incomes, to regulate the size of their families, in short, themselves to follow the older code of personal ethics, no lasting reforms are possible. Surely it is thus evident enough that individual morality has got to precede the social. The social problem, indeed, is but the problem of finding means to educate morally the individuals who make up society. Mass-reme-

dies may be necessary, but only individual moral conduct is a sufficient base for social progress.

Herein lies the potency of personality, of individual example, as a moral force. No moral principle was ever successfully taught to the many except as it was lived, first by the teacher himself, and then by one follower after another until it became a common phenomenon. It is from individual centers that reforms start; history records no instances to the contrary. The teacher may not deem himself better than others, because he sees in them the potentiality of greater achievements than his own; but he must actually *be* better, else he can not raise them to a higher level. This is, if I mistake not, the fundamental law of moral progress. The motive of equality is necessary, but without distinction of better and worse individuals there can be no advance.

Indeed the same is true in other realms than the moral. Progress emanates from unique individuals; they alone furnish its *ποὶ στῶ* while the mass of mankind, relatively equal and undistinguished, is the weight which their lever must lift. Of course the leader, moral or scientific, is not merely a leader. He needs cooperation; he learns from those he teaches. The primacy of the discoverer is not opposed to his interdependence with his fellows. Nor does it matter that most great discoveries were in part, perhaps in every part, suggested to their announcers by fellow-men. The discoverer was none the less able to discern what the suggesters could not see, and to put together into one fecund concept the scattered parts. Thus did Darwin use the ideas of Malthus, Newton the empirical laws of Kepler, Shakespeare the plots of older literature. But we do not account such use a detraction from their originality, their spontaneity and productiveness. It would be as reasonable to deny the superiority of intellect over sense on the ground that all the material of thought is drawn from sense-experience. No, we are not concerned to deny the interdependence of leader and led. But the issue before us is: which of the two deserves the greater consideration from the point of view of progress? While both are equally necessary, one may be of greater value and significance. And it remains true that no doctrine of science, no religious insight or moral maxim, was ever discovered by a body of men working together. On the contrary, the assembled multitude, small or large, is usually hostile to such discoveries—and the larger it is, the more hostile. The mass of humanity, in the degree in which they are influenced by one another—the extreme case being the crowd or mob—become stupid and open to irrational suggestion. Here is the everlasting contribution of Protestantism: the right of private judgment. It is the privacy of the judgment that makes it at once a right and a duty; each man,

though he may and must consider proposals made by others, must decide in his own mind upon the truth of them. Without such a decision, he is tossed about by every wind of doctrine that blows.

It is, to be sure, clear enough that social cooperation in the search for truth is not always a matter of mutual hypnosis. It ceases to be that in proportion as we ascend from the level of the majority. A gathering of specialists, as in a learned society, a board of directors, a committee, is far removed from a crowd; it is what we might call an aristocratic crowd, a selection from the crowd. Such a gathering however is fruitful of results just because it is small and select; by its smallness it gains the unity of purpose which numbers lose, and by its selectness the expert quality. The larger group develops high enthusiasm, but it does not easily display a singleness of purpose, or concentrated will which persists in the face of obstacles. Emotion it possesses, but execution and intelligence on the whole decrease, other things equal, as the numbers increase. And even at meetings of learned societies, it is unusual for discoveries to be made; they are generally made by the scientist working alone. There is, undeniably profit in mental cooperation, exchange of ideas and mutual criticism. In fact, such cooperation is indispensable to most thinkers. But note that the greater the intellect the smaller is the number of colleagues with whom the expert needs to cooperate, and also that he draws profit from the discussion as a rule in the solitary reflection which succeeds it.

And further, even in the cooperation of experts, one contributes more than another. One takes the initiative, others criticize; one outlines a positive thesis, others correct and modify. When a final report is drawn up, it is mainly written by one. The truth finally reached is nearer to the initial view of one than to those of the rest; that one is the one to whom greater opportunity in future meetings is likely to be given. In this way do men select their leaders, to whom they award high administrative or scientific or other positions. If we may safely generalize on the matter, it would seem that on the whole the positive and constructive work is furnished by the unique individual, the corrective, qualifying factor—no less necessary but less creative, admirable, and significant—by the social *milieu*; and the latter is of the greater value as the *milieu* is smaller.

Generally speaking, it is in the arena of action rather than thought that the principle of distinction finds its greatest emphasis. In war-time we appoint dictators. When science becomes applied we cheerfully yield to its purveyors an authority which in the theoretic realm we should hesitate to give. We humbly obey the physician, we take the advice of the engineer, the chemist, the



criminologist. In executive work we have to use the principle of centered responsibility. Even in the field of sport, where the equal level of play is apparently the ruling motive, we have to have captains and umpires. And all this is the best confirmation of the view that the principle of distinction is the more important of the two principles: for when the supreme test, the test of action, is brought to bear, that principle is the one that bears the burden of accomplishment.

It is often said that before the moral law men are equal; it is as true that after the moral law they are different. I mean that after they have made their choices, have done right or wrong, differences of character begin to appear. The great cleavage between bad and good then arises; society punishes those whose choice is injurious to society by giving them less than the equal opportunity they had enjoyed. Indeed one's whole character, so far as he is free to mould it, his whole uniqueness and thereby distinctiveness from others, depends on his own personal selection. Freedom of choice is itself a distinction, a preference of one out of a number of equally possible choices. Thus distinction is the very foundation stone of morality.

In education, the pupil is necessarily, in the respect in which he is to learn, the teacher's inferior. He must first learn by rule and rote, by discipline, and with a minimum of choice. There is no question of equality. It may be objected that this is an old and erroneous view of education, harking back to the era of brute force. The newer practise of moral suasion, however, uses the same methods, even though by means of spiritual rather than physical compulsion. The pupil must at least *trust* the teacher. As the pupil grows older, he becomes more nearly equal to the teacher, but the relationship remains asymmetrical. He can not profitably even choose all of his studies; the abandoning of the purely elective system in our colleges is the proof of this. But is there not absolute equality in the class-room, between the many pupils? By no means. Brillancy is rewarded, sloth penalized. Equal standards of grading, equal opportunity to study, recite, offer suggestions and hear explanations—these exist or should exist; but there should also be incentive for the embryo genius. Nor is the object of education to produce equality, at least beyond a certain point. There is a certain minimum of information, of course, a certain liberality and tolerance of attitude, which should be imparted to all, but education aims also to foster originality and superiority. The able student is advised to continue his studies; scholarships are awarded him; to the duller no such aid is given. Education can not create ability, but it does try to develop it, and to develop most the most able. It builds upon the dictum "to him that hath shall be given." The

educator knows well that the world will look to the exceptional individuals he can produce, and his interest is unavoidably centered in those individuals.

The result of our inductive survey is then this. There is, first, in each of the great fields of human activity here considered, a fundamental duality. We find a principle of equality and a principle of distinction or superiority. In each several field, equality rules at the beginning. It knits together the parts that constitute the field. To science, all facts are equally real, worthy of consideration, and necessary; to religion, all men have equal opportunity, are initially equal before God; to morality, all are, or should be, equally free and subject to the moral law; in education, all should have equal opportunity to develop their endowments. And doubtless in politics and industry, the same equality must always be our ideal; every one should have a vote and an equal chance to work and earn a decent living, to contribute his meed to society. Secondly, however, we find that in each field *as development proceeds* the principle of distinction is involved. Some members are found sooner or later to demand a greater opportunity than others. For science, some facts are of pivotal significance and demand more study than others, some hypotheses are more fertile than others; for religion, some men are seers and are selected as priests; for morality, the better ones must be given opportunity commensurate with their deserts; in education, the geniuses must be favored; and in politics the suffrage of all should lead to the conferring of power upon specially gifted experts, whether as representatives or as executives. And in every field, the conferring of greater opportunity upon the selected ones is followed by order and progress.

The organic view, by which individual and society are deemed always interlocking and interpenetrating, is a symmetrical view; the position here defended is asymmetrical. Or better, it is partly symmetrical and partly asymmetrical. While individual and society are in great measure mutually supporting, the individual factor's part is the deeper one. From exceptional individuals, as from dynamic centers, originate forces which spread and mould society, which in turn reacts and moulds the individual. By emphasizing the interdependence alone, the organic view misses the inequalities, the nodal points, the novelties which the individual factors provide, and which save humanity from being reduced to the dead level of each-involving-all, every-man-equally-important-to-the-whole. It misses the odd, incalculable chance-variation which the individual now and again furnishes, the motive of dash, brilliancy, and adventure; the romantic quality, in short, which a balanced organic unity, the model of classic perfection, will never display.

It is, in fact, quite false to assume that man is *not anything whatsoever* of and by himself alone. We might know that so one-sided a view is bound to be mistaken; and it needs but a little unprejudiced observation to reveal aspects of life wherein one may be and often is quite sufficient unto himself. In the enjoyment of art's masterpieces, in exquisite, uncommunicated moments of spiritual exaltation, and at the other extreme in the simple sensual pleasures, we have sufficient refutation of this social-relation view. And it would seem that no educated thinker should need such instances, for it was long ago objected that if no individual is aught of himself, he can not become aught by relation to others who are naught of themselves. Why do we not see that the social relation theory is just as exclusive and narrow in its own way as was the older individualism? The truth is that man is in some ways and to some degree fairly complete by himself, and in other ways and perhaps to a greater degree dependent on his fellows.

These being the two underlying and unequally weighted ideals in the several fields of man's culture, what are we to say of democracy?

The natural view historically is that democracy is in line with equality, and if not opposed to superiority, at least neglectful of it. We should then say that the democratic ideal asserts "all men should have equal opportunity to develop their contributions to society." This coincides roughly with the meaning of the motto "liberty, equality, fraternity," with the statement that "all men are born free and equal" so far as that statement is true, and with the ideals of equal privilege for all classes which govern so much of current ethics and socialism.

But if so, democracy is clearly one-sided and therefore dangerous. By neglecting, even if not explicitly denying, the need of initiative and leadership, it tends toward an all-leveling type of society of which Bolshevism is the extreme case. Much of the criticism of our present administration is due, I think, to the feeling that it is facing too nearly in this direction—and I share that feeling. There is, however, a fairly widespread belief that if the principle of equal opportunity were realized, the other principle would take care of itself; and if this is true, then democracy even in the one-sided interpretation is far from dangerous, being rather the one guarantee of social stability and progress. But it is not true. It does not follow that men do justice to the motive of distinction, once the principle of equality is assured. In fact in our society to-day there is a strong current which sets in the opposite direction. But even were this not the case, equality merely of itself does not involve the emergence and selection of superior individuals; not, at any rate, of the requisite quality and degree.

That equal opportunity entails the selection of those who have achieved more than their fellows, and the conferring upon them of greater opportunity, is not usually the fact. In science, as has been indicated, it needs a special effort on the part of the investigator to single out the fertile hypothesis and the pivotal fact. In morals, the freedom to do one's duty by no means ensures the doing of it, nor are the faithful necessarily rewarded according to their faithfulness. In education, the equal opportunity of the recitation-room hardly guarantees that the genius will further pursue his studies; special opportunity, in the form of financial aid and expert guidance, must be added. In the learned society even, where discussion is free, it does not always follow that the most intelligent view will win the day; it demands arduous labor to ensure its proper emphasis in the resulting decision. Equal opportunity no doubt makes these possible; but it is far from sufficing to produce them. To speak in Aristotelian terms, it is the potential factor of progress; the actualizing cause lies in the strenuous toil of men more highly endowed than their fellows. Such toil no laws, systems, or institutions can guarantee beforehand—effort alone will do it. But that effort needs encouragement; whereas a society which puts a premium upon equality and social fusion discourages it. Progress is no necessary result, fatally determined when we equalize privileges. The persistent effort, the "heave of the will," by those who see further than their fellows, alone will bring it about.

And many men will probably admit that we need not only the one but both principles, equal opportunity and selection of superiors; and that we need also to exercise special care with regard to the latter. And because they love democracy, and are unwilling to admit inadequacy in the notion, they prefer to interpret it to mean a union of the two ideals, each contributing to the other, each meaningless without the other. This is the organic view of democracy.

Yet, appear though it does to be broader, it is one-sided and inadequate. As above indicated, it misses the asymmetry of life and of human needs. It forgets that there is a primacy among equals; that the leader is greater than the led, and deserves more attention and nourishment. The organic view, seemingly inclusive, is really exclusive; by insisting that the individual is everywhere dependent on society, it excludes the free individual, independently originating what others can not originate, *starting* a social process which is carried out indeed by the cooperation of society. Thus, though it looks to embrace both individual and social organism, the organic view of democracy really loses the former, and returns to the motive of equality alone. For in the social organism, all members are, just so far as it is an organism, equally nec-

essary; hence the motive of equality is the only motive genuinely accepted. In the same way Hegelian idealism, with all its synthetic motive, failed to include realism. The only way to ensure the inclusion of the individual is to include him as by himself, independent of society—which is to take him as a *creator*, to emphasize his function as positive.

It would be in any case impossible to preserve long an even balance of these motives; selection is too deeply ingrained in the nature of men and things. As well might one expect to walk by putting both feet forward at once. That is why, with the decline of the older aristocracy, we tend to proceed to the other extreme of the all-levelling sort of democracy.

But what concrete difference does all this make?

In the first place, while it does make a great deal, that difference will consist in a multitude of minor acts, and attitudes, rather than in some tangible social or material product. It is intangible; it can not be exhibited to the people's gaze. There could not be a party, a sect, devoted to the emphasis of distinctiveness, as there is a Socialist party, a Labor party, and endless "social reform" clubs. It is a matter of slow education, an inner spiritual process demanding some solitude and obscurity. In the degree in which genius gets hardened into organization, it is likely to lose spontaneity and sincerity. This is an old truth which we are forgetting, illustrated by the whole history of the Christian Church and even more in the lives of politicians. The motive of publicity is to the spiritual evolution here urged a thing of evil. To the public-loving American, of course, this is an absurdity; with his admiration for the concrete he confuses accomplishment with material production, and points with pride to institutions organized, societies founded, to journals full of debates, to buildings. But these things are only to a small extent the condition of advance; they are mainly a necessary by-product or at most a result. The cultivation of the spiritual side is the valuable thing. To be sure, nobody denies the desirability, the necessity even, of organizations—provided we do not have too many. It is all a question of relative emphasis. Publicity and pomp are the fruit and flower, education the roots, which lie and do their work in the dark. And even the ascending sap is not seen.

Still, more definite differences than this would follow. In one or two fields at least, rather specific corollaries may be drawn. Thus, in religion, we unquestionably need more of the spirit of worship and prayer, more thought of the Deity, and a more intimate relationship to Him, with less insistence upon social work and morality. These latter have lately tended to crowd out the worship of

God and of the love of God,—which is the foundation-stone of religion, the source of the strength it bestows upon men to live moral lives. Clergymen, anxious to appeal to their congregations, feel that they must adapt religion to the prevalent over-emphasis of social problems, and thereby religion loses much of its character as a haven of rest and reservoir of strength to the weary reformer. In this respect we must admit that Catholicism is far ahead of Protestantism. It is a beautiful irony that the Protestant, standing originally for the individualistic principle of private judgment and independence, is making more concession to the motive of social fusion, the fashion of the day, than the Catholic.

In education it seems desirable to establish a system of pass-and-honors courses, whereby those who display special powers are given greater opportunity than the rest, to an extent which our present system hardly permits. If I am correctly informed, this was not long ago proposed at one of our large universities, and was rejected on the ground that it was undemocratic. That is certainly the case, in the more usual meaning of "undemocratic," but it is a reason for accepting the system. We need an education which will encourage dissent from the majority-opinion; at present it rather discourages such dissent.

But also we must have a change of heart in the unofficial social relationships. Said a European to me, "How gregarious you Americans are!" It would be difficult, indeed, to exaggerate our gregariousness. The number of associations, clubs, groups, committees even, which many of us belong to, is truly marvelous. I know several cases in my profession, of men who began careers full of promise, only to be swamped by a tide of committee-work, offices held, reports to write or read, meetings they must attend, and so on. These men, by their own testimony, long for solitude, for leisure to think. All in professional circles, and presumably in other circles, know such instances. Of the young this is also true. The able college student is too often exhausted by the number of his college activities, literary, social, religious, dramatic, even athletic—anything to bring out the powers of cooperation! When have they time to develop habits of thoughtfulness? They will certainly not get it later. One wonders if there are not as many societies—social clubs, professional associations, leagues, lodges, *etc.*,—as there are individuals. And yet it is being suggested that we have more and more—guilds, neighborhood groups, occupational groups, school centers: as if the poor, struggling, sweating citizen who tries to be in the forefront of the social wave were not already tired out. But always with too much energizing goes too little energy. It is over-socialization that has so increased the "pace that kills" as to make

“nervous breakdown” one of our commonest maladies. If we could but have the courage to resign from about half of the societies we belong to, and thereby to save a little strength for the prosecution of our own work, to play with our children, to spend a few days in quietly doing *nothing!* The excess of group-influence is seen in other ways than exhaustion and unproductiveness. It inhibits freedom. One is constantly being engulfed by some social wave or popular craze. Twenty years ago everyone—old men and women, little girls and boys—had to ride the bicycle. The excuse then was that it did one good to get out of doors, but the real reason was that all the people did it; for after a few years the custom vanished. But for a time many people were afraid not to ride the bicycle. That craze was followed by a golf-playing one, where the universality of the practise resulted in many odd spectacles. In late years we have the excess of motoring: many people own cars who can not afford to do so—because others own them. Soon, no doubt, there will be a riot of flying. But the great wave which is now overwhelming us is one of giving. We must feed every one in the world; is it not selfish to refuse? We must borrow in order to give. And the freedom of giving disappears, when we are pursued on the trains, in the street-cars, to the doors of our homes, and besought to give. Private begging has been replaced by public begging—and we dare not refuse, so great is the social pressure. How can I become a nobler spiritual being when I give away what my family needs, because I am forced by fear of public reproach to do so? Not only does over-socialization tend to kill the very brotherly love it was designed to foster; it kills also the virtue of thrift and foresight, of providing for one’s own family’s future, the education of the children. Another most striking example of these social water-spouts is the prohibition-measure just adopted by our nation. Total prohibition is an extreme, a form of intemperance, as much as drunkenness is. I know men, not a few, who had never been advocates of prohibition, had in fact long derided it, yet who in the last year suddenly began to find reasons for adopting it. One of the commonest is that one does not believe in total abstinence for one’s self, but for the sake of the poor inebriate who can not control his desire. Thus the social motive is again invoked; and thousands of temperate men are compelled to deprive themselves of a natural, simple and harmless pleasure. The hope of the situation is, however, that these popular waves subside as quickly as they come, and there must before long be a reaction from all such forms of intemperance. One is often tempted to say that the American character is essentially an intemperate character; but I do not believe the intemperance is due to anything more than the present over-emphasis of the social motive.

In the linguistic field we find a like phenomenon. It is natural that the majority of people use slang phrases; and to this it is prudish to object. What is abnormal is that the *littérateurs* and linguists do so, and put those phrases into the dictionaries. The theory of language becomes quite equalitarian: whatever the people use is good, taste being replaced by popularity, good use by use. The experts do not wish, and perhaps they do not dare, to set themselves up as better than the crowd. That current slang has little merit is shown by the brevity of its life; it seldom outlasts two or three years. Instead of elevating the people's standards, this cult of equality lowers the standards of the educated. Is this a condition of progress in English? We may be, indeed, developing a *new* language, but it is so unstable, so subject to popular mood, that it can hardly solidify into an identifiable tongue, or even dialect.

The potent microbe that infests the doctrine of democracy, whether that democracy be conceived as equality or as the social organism, is fear of society. When all is said and done, men fear nothing so much to-day as being considered solitary, or unsocial, or eccentric. Let every man search his own heart and verify this statement. Man's old weakness was physical fear, now universally despised. Perhaps the day will come when social cowardice will be equally detested. At present, excusing itself too often by the one-sided doctrine that man is wholly a social being, it has suppressed the natural growth of the instincts in man which make for independence, and whose development alone can produce individuals who are but to lead the way forward.

The defect of democracy, *viz.*, over-socialization and social cowardice, can be overcome only by a gradual spiritual education which will restore our vanishing respect for the more valuable elements of society, independent leaders.

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## ON THE EXTENSION OF THE COMMON LOGIC

CERTAIN remarks on the generalization of the common logic and on the construction of other systems of inference, which the writer addressed to the members of the Philosophical Association at the meeting of December, 1917, have called forth a good deal of unpublished criticism.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See the articles, *Aristotle's Other Logic* (*American Journal of Psychology*, Oct., 1918, pp. 431-434), *Non-Aristotelian Logic* (this JOURNAL, Aug. 15, 1918), and *On the Construction of a Non-Aristotelian Logic* (*Monist*, July, 1918).